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THE FOLLY- AND FAITH-OF FURMAN
John H. Blume* and Sheri Lynn Johnson**
Justice Marshall's opinion in Furman v. Georgia
memorably characterizes the abolition of capital punishment as
"a major milestone in the long road up from barbarism."' For
abolitionists today, it is surprising to recall that this phrase was
not coined by Marshall, but borrowed from former Attorney
General Ramsey Clark.2 That the chief law enforcement official
of the United States might publicly condemn capital punishment
is, from a modem perspective, almost unimaginable. Since then,
we have seen one liberal presidential candidacy founder at least
in part on resisting the lure of vengeance: Michael Dukakis's
rejection of capital punishment even for a hypothesized
murderer of his wife hurt him badly. We have also watched two
purportedly liberal candidates hustle to support capital
punishment in particularly dubious circumstances; Bill Clinton
*Professor, Cornell Law School, and Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project.
**James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Assistant
Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project.
1. 408 U.S. 238, 370 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
2. Ramsey Clark, Crime in America 336 (Simon & Schuster 1970).
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left the campaign trail to sign the death warrant of a man so
mentally impaired by a self-inflicted gunshot wound that he
didn't understand dying,3 and Barack Obama joined the clamor
against a (conservative) Supreme Court's decision that
imposition of the death penalty for child rape is
unconstitutional.4 But back in Furman's day, it was politically
possible to condemn capital punishment. Indeed, by the time the
Court decided Furman, it seemed that, like torture, capital
punishment would eventually and inevitably be consigned to the
dustbin of history.5
In fact, Furman was the culmination of a long campaign by
the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP, one fought on multiple
constitutional fronts in the attempt to achieve a moratorium. The
LDF attack on the death penalty, which began because of
manifest racial injustice in the imposition of the death penalty,
continued to gather data on racial disparities in anticipation of a
racial challenge. But it also pressed the issue of "death
qualification," which resulted in the seating of juries particularly
likely to convict and prone to favor capital punishment, the
unreliability in the sentencing determination introduced by
unitary proceedings, the broad use of capital punishment for
crimes less than murder, and the lack of guidance given to juries
in the determination of whether death was appropriate.
When Furman struck down capital punishment statutes
from Georgia and Texas, the LDF's jubilation is easily
imagined, and has been somewhat ruefully chronicled.6 Whether
3. Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime: Costly,
Counterproductive and Corrupting, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1069, 1071 (1996).
4. A.P. News Rel., McCain, Obama Disagree with Child Rape Ruling, http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/25379987/ (June 26, 2008) (quoting then-candidate Obama: "I think
that the rape of a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime and if a state makes a
decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances the death penalty is at least
potentially applicable, that that does not violate our Constitution") (accessed Oct. 22, 2012;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
5. Now, of course, it is clear that torture was not so clearly consigned to that dustbin
either. See e.g. Anthony Clark Arend, Who's Afraid of the Geneva Conventions? Treaty
Interpretation in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 22 Am. U. Int. L. Rev. 709, 714
(2007) (discussing the legal opinion of Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo that
"because al Qaeda is a non-state actor, it can not be deemed to be a party to the Geneva
Conventions and thus its members would not enjoy the rights given to prisoners of war,"
including the right not to be tortured).
6. Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment
290 (Random House 1973) (reporting that the LDF received messages of both "praise and
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or not the euphoria was widely shared, the belief-or, at least,
the fervent hope-that Furman signaled the end of capital
punishment was not limited to the abolitionist camp. 7 That hope,
however, was short-lived. The backlash to Furman was both
swift and furious. Public outrage was fierce, and by 1976, thirty-
five states had enacted new capital punishment statutes designed
to remedy the flaws identified in the Furman opinions.
Although almost 600 lives were spared by Furman-lives
that, as Joan Cheever documented, were largely lived out
nonviolentlyg8-in the end, or at least in the middle, capital
punishment was both reinstated and reinvigorated. Four years
later, in Gregg v. Georgia,9 the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's
new "guided discretion" capital punishment statute, and by the
end of the century, American executions approached a hundred a
year. Why? There are many answers, including rising crime
rates and changes in Supreme Court personnel. But certainly
some of the explanation lies in the multiple Furman opinions,
for just as Brown v. Board of Education Iexemplifies strategic
unanimity, Furman reflects a remarkable disregard for
consensus. Every Justice wrote his own opinion, and none of the
Justices in the majority even joined another Justice's opinion.
The articles in this section reveal, in different but fundamental
ways, both the folly of that fractured approach and an animating
faith that Furman was nonetheless rightly decided.
Professor Sullivan's article i  explores the persistent
problem of race. As he explains, concerns about racial bias in
the administration of capital punishment, especially in Southern
states, influenced the decisions of several members of the
Furman majority. However, Gregg upheld the new and (in the
opinion of their supporters) improved capital-sentencing
schemes, relying upon the unsubstantiated claim that racial
scorn" once news of Furman began to circulate); see also Carol S. Steiker, Furman v.
Georgia: Not an End, But a Beginning, in Death Penalty Stories 102 (John H. Blume &
Jordan M. Steiker eds., Found. Press 2009) (describing the celebration at the LDF offices
when Furman was announced).
7. Steiker, supra n. 6, at 103 (reporting that Justice Douglas sent a handwritten note to
Justice Brennan expressing the hope that they had accomplished "total abolition").
8. Joan M. Cheever, Back from the Dead (John Wiley 2006).
9. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. J. Thomas Sullivan, The Abyss of Racism, 13 J. App. Prac. & Process 91 (2012).
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discrimination would be limited by procedures that guided the
jury's discretion and required state appellate courts to review,
and set aside, death sentences influenced by race or other
arbitrary factors. In the post-Gregg years, numerous studies-
the most comprehensive of which was the Georgia study
conducted by the late David Baldus-revealed that the new
guided-discretion schemes failed to curb racial discrimination,
especially in black-defendant/white-victim cases. But, in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 2 the Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Powell, rejected an equal protection and
Eighth Amendment challenge to a Georgia death sentence based
on the Baldus Study, finding only a "risk"'13 that racial bias
affected a death sentence in any particular case. Not stopping
there, the Court declared that statistical evidence of racial
discrimination in the imposition of capital punishment,
regardless of its strength, would never be enough, without
evidence of racially discriminatory purpose, to invalidate a death
sentence.
As Professor Sullivan's article reveals, both in broad
strokes and in his discussion of Arkansas death inmate Frank
Williams's case, McCleskey has effectively insulated from
judicial review challenges that the death penalty is applied in a
racially discriminatory manner. And after detailing strong
evidence of racial bias in the application of the death penalty in
multiple contexts such as decisions to seek death against
minority defendants, the exclusion of minority jurors from
capital trials, and the lack of vigorous and adequate
representation of minority defendants, he concludes that the
Supreme Court's highly deferential review of state court
decisions results in a failure of judicial action and "reflects a
continued failure to recognize the damage done to the integrity
of the criminal-justice process when race is a factor in the
decision to impose the ultimate punishment.'
14
Mr. Newton's article' 5 addresses another byproduct of the
Furman majority's failure to end the American experiment with
12. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
13. Id. at 291 n. 7.
14. Sullivan, supra n. 11, at 116-17.
15. Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furnan's Machinery of Death, 13 J. App.
Prac. & Process 41 (2012).
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capital punishment. He points out that the various constitutional
defects in the pre-Furman capital sentencing schemes identified
by the five members in the Furman majority continued to
influence the Court's post-Furman capital-punishment
jurisprudence, producing "an extremely complex body of
constitutional rules in capital cases, which has made the wheels
of [the machinery of death] move very slowly."'16 He further
argues that the system's demonstrated inability to address (often
valid) claims of constitutional error in capital cases in a timely
manner-some current inmates have been on death row for
more than thirty years-is itself cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment because "systemic delays
have undermined the legitimate purposes of capital
punishment. 17
Mr. Newton offers two possible solutions to what he refers
to as the "paradox" of excessive delay.18 The first is to create a
"third generation death-penalty machine" that would
significantly reduce the number of death-row inmates by
significantly limiting the pool of death-eligible defendants,
creating more rigorous trial procedures to reduce the risk of
wrongful conviction, and expediting appeals and barring re-
prosecution (at least capitally) when certain types of error are
found. 19 In theory, this would allow the system to process the
much smaller pool of cases in a timely and rational manner. The
second is to allow courts to invalidate individual death sentences
when the delay reaches a certain temporal point (for example,
fifteen years) and is attributable to state actors.2 ° Mr. Newton
acknowledges that the current Court is likely to do neither, but
maintains that this is "no reason to allow the current death-
penalty machine to grind on at such an excruciatingly slow
pace." 1
16. Id. at 45.
17. Id. at 65.
18. Id. at 67-68.
19. Id. at 68-70.
20. Id. at 71-72.
21. Id. at 73.
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The third piece in this special section 22 chronicles Justice
Harry Blackmun's capital punishment metamorphosis. Mr.
Schapiro divides Justice Backmun's evolution into three phases:
Phase one (1976-1986) involved a search for an appropriate set
of constitutional norms regulating capital punishment.2 Then in
phase two (1987-1991), Justice Blackmun became increasingly
disillusioned with the Court's attempt to regulate the ultimate
punishment. 24 Finally, phase three (1991-1994) was marked by
Justice Blackmun's dismay at the Court's refusal to
acknowledge that the modem American death penalty was
irreparably broken.25 The culmination of Justice Blackmun's
evolution was his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Callins
v. Collins, in which he famously stated: "From this day forward,
I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."2
Mr. Schapiro posits that three main concerns drove Justice
Blackmun to repudiate capital punishment. The first was his
inability to reconcile in his own mind the two fundamental
components of the Court's post-Furman Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence: the requirements that the jury's discretion be
sufficiently guided versus the mandate that a capital defendant
was entitled to individualized sentencing.2 7 Second, Justice
Blackmun was persuaded that the death-penalty system was
infected with racial discrimination. 28 The final nail in Justice
Blackmun's death-penalty coffin was the Court's steady
onslaught of decisions restricting federal courts' habeas corpus
review powers.29 Mr. Schapiro argues that Justice Blackmun
was convinced that limiting federal court intervention so
deregulated the administration of capital punishment that his
conscience would no longer allow him to vote to uphold any
death sentence.
Just as Justice Marshall is commonly credited with
claiming that the abolition of capital punishment was a "major
22. Andrew J. Schapiro, A Sober Second Thought, 13 J. App. Prac. & Process 75
(2012).
23. Id. at 77-81.
24. Id. at 81-84.
25. Id. at 84-86.
26. 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994).
27. Schapiro, supra n. 22, at 86, 88.
28. Id. at 89.
29. Id. at 88-89.
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milestone on the long road up from barbarism," Martin Luther
King, Jr., is often quoted as having made the parallel though
obviously broader claim that "[t]he moral arc of the universe is
long, but it bends toward justice." This more sweeping empirical
claim was not original to King either,30 but the underlying
sentiment continues inspire efforts in the face of very slow
progress toward greater humanity. What is strange and strangely
disturbing about the Furman story is not the speed of change,
however, but its reversal. As the articles in this special section
demonstrate, this reversal is not a reflection of the ambiguity of
the legal and moral questions before the Furman court. Rather,
the path between Furman and Gregg is a blip in the moral arc of
the universe, a detour on the long road up from barbarism.
30. See e.g. All Things Considered, Radio Broad. (NPR Sept. 2, 2010) (featuring Prof.
Clayborne Carson, Founding Director, Martin Luther King, Jr., Research and Education
Institute, Stanford University, who traces the roots of the King quotation back to similar
sentiments in the works of nineteenth-century abolitionist Theodore Parker).

